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Key Theoretical 
Issues in the 
Interaction of 
Law and Religion: 
A Guide for the 
Perplexed
There is perhaps no more important access 
point into the key issues of modern political 
and legal theory than the questions raised by 
the interaction of law and religion in contem-
porary constitutional democracies. Of course, 
much classical political and moral theory was 
forged on the issue of the relationship between 
religious difference and state authority. John 
Locke’s work was directly influenced by this is-
sue, writing as he did about the just configura-
tion of state authority and moral difference in 
the wake of the Thirty Years’ War. Yet debates 
about the appropriate role of religion in public 
life and the challenges posed by religious differ-
ence also cut an important figure, in a variety of 
ways, in the writings of Hobbes, Rousseau, Spi-
noza, Hegel, and much of the work that we now 
view as being at the centre of the development 
of modern political philosophy.1 Furthermore, 
the mutual imbrications of law and religion in 
the development of the western legal tradition 
are many and well established. At the structural 
level, Harold Berman famously traces the ori-
gins of modern western European legal systems 
to the Papal Revolution begun in 1075.2 James 
Whitman shows the extent to which this mutu-
al influence is (elusively) true of core doctrines 
of contemporary law, such as the principle of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.3 The relation-
ship between law and religion has been fertile 
soil for both the development of the modern le-
gal system and the foundations of modern po-
litical philosophy.
Yet the claim at the outset of this article was 
that the questions generated by the interaction 
of law and religion are indispensible contempo-
rary channels into the core questions of mod-
ern political and legal theory. Recent years have 
seen a migration of issues regarding religious 
difference and the nature and structure of the 
state back to the centre of legal and political the-
ory. As western liberal democracies have been 
met with heretofore unprecedented degrees and 
forms of religious diversity, we have watched as 
diverse political and legal traditions have strug-
gled mightily with the interaction among law, 
politics, and religion. The exigency and central-
ity of issues of law and religion to contemporary 
thinking about the just state is evidenced by a 
host of high-profile issues such as the Dutch 
cartoon controversy; the French political and 
legal response to the Islamic veil; U.S. debates 
over the presence of religious symbols, such as 
the Ten Commandments, in public space; and 
the hand-wringing of constitutional theorists 
about the appropriate role to be given to religion 
in the crafting of new constitutions for transi-
tional states such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Giv-
en Canada’s official state policy of multicultur-
alism, Canadian political and legal philosophy 
has long been consumed with issues of cultural 
difference and the law. Religion has found its 
way to the centre of conversations about multi-
culturalism, spawning a host of cases before the 
Supreme Court of Canada, a new body of legal 
scholarship, and a high-profile public commis-
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sion looking at issues of the accommodation of 
religious difference.4
Put briefly, the interaction of law and reli-
gion is the field on which questions central to 
contemporary constitutional and political the-
ory are being debated and worked out. The area 
is deserving of philosophical attention because, 
arguably more than any other contemporary is-
sue in the law, debates about law and religion 
are exposing crucial fault lines in modern legal 
and political theory, some old and some rather 
new. The fraught contemporary relationship be-
tween law and religion raises issues about the 
nature of modern law, adjudication, and rights, 
and provides unique access to problems of com-
munity, identity, belonging, and authority that 
lie at the heart of contemporary democratic and 
political theory. Meaningful study of the rela-
tionship between law and religion also resists 
disciplinary boundaries, inviting and perhaps 
demanding the insights of history, philosophy, 
sociology, and anthropology.
This piece is intended to serve as a kind of 
philosophical or conceptual primer on a set of 
issues that, whether raised overtly in public de-
bates or not, shape and suffuse conversations 
about the relationship between law and religion 
in the modern state. The concepts and debates 
raised are at work in many constitutional orders, 
and appreciation of these abiding issues is cru-
cial to understanding the relationship between 
law and religion wherever it arises. Indeed, un-
derstanding these broader themes is invaluable 
in the comparative study of law and religion, 
a point that will be made below. Nevertheless, 
this short article specifically seeks to ground 
the examination of these issues in Canadian 
social and jurisprudential soil. In the end, the 
hope is not only to provide a broad mapping of 
certain central theoretical issues at the heart of 
the study of law and religion, thereby helping 
to orient a reader interested in this debate, but 
also to give a flavour of the way in which these 
issues offer uniquely valuable conduits into key 
questions in contemporary legal and political 
philosophy.
1.	 Defining	“the	secular”
Perhaps the key definitional issue at play in 
philosophical and legal debates regarding the 
interaction of law and religion is the issue of 
how one is to understand the idea of the “secu-
lar.” The word “secular” circulates promiscu-
ously in popular, political, and academic dis-
cussions of modern constitutional democracy, 
but its precise meaning and the implications of 
the concept for law and public policy are deep-
ly uncertain and the root of much debate and 
conflict in this area. At its outer limits, the term 
is unproblematic; a secular state can be distin-
guished from a theocracy wherein there is no 
distinction between public authority and reli-
gious authority. Short of this bright line, how-
ever, one finds a spectrum of definitions and 
understandings of the meaning and demands 
of secularism. It would be comfortingly simple 
if one could attribute differences about the just 
relationship between religion and the law to the 
distinction between those who assert a commit-
ment to secularism and those who disavow the 
concept. Instead, what one finds in the scholar-
ship and jurisprudence is an enormous breadth 
of conceptions of the secular among those who 
agree that it is a concept of importance in mod-
ern constitutional and political thought.
Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration is an 
important touchstone for one vision of the sec-
ular.5 Locke’s preoccupation in the letter is to 
distinguish the jurisdiction of the church from 
that of the commonwealth. Locke famously 
wrote:
[T]he church itself is a thing absolutely sepa-
rate and distinct from the commonwealth. 
The boundaries on both sides are fixed and 
immovable. He jumbles heaven and earth to-
gether, the things most remote and opposite, 
who mixes these societies, which are, in their 
original, end, business, and in every thing, 
perfectly distinct, and infinitely different from 
each other.6
This vision of the separation of state authority 
from religious authority remains an influen-
tial conception of the meaning of the secular; 
a secular constitution is one that achieves a 
sharp division between church and state. When 
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religion mixes with the authority of the magis-
trate (to use Locke’s term for the person wield-
ing state power), one is faced with a breach of a 
particular understanding of the demands of a 
secular polity. One might point to the U.S. Con-
stitution’s doctrine of non-establishment as the 
quintessential modern expression of this vision 
of secularism. The first amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution states that “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”; and 
so in the U.S. context the movement of public 
funds from state to religion is intrinsically sus-
pect. One commonly referenced counterpoint 
to the U.S. example is that of Germany, where 
religion receives all manner of state support, 
“establishing” religion in a number of ways that 
would be anathema in the United States. The 
picture is rather more complex, however, and 
this complexity is telling of an important point 
that has emerged in contemporary scholarship 
about the nature of secularism.
In an important article on comparative is-
sues in law and religion, James Whitman dem-
onstrates that although there is an institutional 
separation of church and state in the United 
States, there is a mixing of religion and politics 
and religion and law that would be offensive to 
European sensibilities.7 By contrast, the Euro-
pean model mixes the institutions of govern-
ment and religious institutions to a degree un-
acceptable to U.S. eyes, but is far stricter about 
the separation of politics and law from religious 
reasons and rhetoric. The inconvenient truth, 
as Whitman explains, is that “[b]oth represent 
forms of the separation of church and state.”8 
Whitman’s article points to an important in-
sight that has been generated from contempo-
rary scholarship regarding the concept of the 
secular: namely, that there are “secularisms” 
rather than a single configuration of the secu-
lar. A number of scholars working in religious 
studies and political theory have emphasized 
this point, tracking the diverse manifestations 
of the porous commitment to the “secular” in a 
variety of national traditions.9 This scholarship 
shows that, short of serving to distinguish po-
litical orders from outright theocracy, the term 
“secular” serves, at most, as a placeholder for a 
set of possible institutional and social arrange-
ments that seek to secure an appropriate role for 
religion in public life.10 Accordingly, the term 
“secular” is a flag marking a site of debate about 
the scope and shape of this “appropriate role.”
What, then, are some of the leading posi-
tions on the meaning of the “secular” as a legal 
and political concept? Locke’s bare statement 
cited above reflects one still-influential concep-
tion of the proper place of religion in public af-
fairs—that it ought to be confined to the private 
realm, ceding public space to language, argu-
ments, and symbols that can attract the support 
and allegiance of any citizen, irrespective of 
his or her religious commitments. John Rawls 
stands as the most prominent and frequently 
invoked exponent of this position on the use of 
religious reasons in public decision-making.11 
One of his central arguments is that modern 
constitutional democracy requires individu-
als, as a matter of civic respect, to bracket their 
“comprehensive doctrines,” including their re-
ligious perspectives, in favour of “public rea-
sons”—reasons that can attract the overlapping 
consensus of all of those who view a matter with 
disinterested reason.12 On this view, secularism 
inheres in the withdrawal of religion and reli-
gious reasons from the public sphere.13 Applied 
to the interaction of law and religion, this vi-
sion of the secular requires the independence 
of law and legal decision-making from religious 
influences.
An alternative perspective on the mean-
ing and implications of the idea of secularism 
understands the command that law and public 
affairs be conducted on a secular basis as a ges-
ture towards a kind of pluralism or inclusive-
ness based on multicultural equality.14 Those 
who take this view of the secular argue that it 
is not only impossible, but also undesirable, for 
a culturally diverse society to require that reli-
gion be bracketed when one enters into debate 
about law and public affairs.15 Parekh, for exam-
ple, while accepting a “weak” secularism that 
requires the separation of religious and state 
institutions, resists a “strong secularism” that 
would require that “political debate and delib-
eration should be conducted in terms of secular 
reasons alone,”16 arguing that to do so is “un-
wise because it deprives political life of both the 
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valuable insights religion offers and the moral 
energies it can mobilize for just and worthwhile 
causes.”17 Although those who take this “plural-
ist” approach to secularism vary broadly on the 
limits that they might impose on the influence 
of religion on public decision-making, all agree 
that secularism does not demand the expulsion 
of religion from the public sphere.
I have focused thus far on the role that dif-
fering definitions of the secular may have on 
one’s view of the appropriate role for religion in 
public decision-making. Yet the way one imag-
ines the secular has implications for a host of le-
gal issues with which courts have had to wrestle 
in recent years. One’s view of the demands of 
secularism affects the propriety of the display 
of religious symbols in public space. Despite the 
vast differences between their traditions, both 
the U.S. and France have faced this issue in the 
display of the Ten Commandments and the 
wearing of “conspicuous” religious symbols in 
public schools, respectively. Whereas the issue is 
processed through the logic of non-establishment 
in the United States and through ideas of laïcité18 
in France, both are ultimately debates about the 
meaning of living in a secular constitutional de-
mocracy. One’s approach to secularism may also 
affect the difficult legal question of the margin 
that ought to be afforded for religious law to 
operate independently of state interference—a 
matter that, in 2004, was debated in Canada in 
the form of controversy about Islamic law-based 
family arbitration.19 Indeed, one finds—more or 
less explicitly—debates about the meaning and 
implications of secularism at the core of much 
constitutional adjudication about the limits 
of legal tolerance and the demand for accom-
modation of religious difference. A recent case 
heard by the Supreme Court of Canada led it to 
reflect explicitly on the meaning of the secular 
and the requirements of accommodation and 
tolerance in a multicultural society. In Cham-
berlain v Surrey School District No 3620 the 
Court was asked to rule on the significance of 
a legislative mandate that public schooling be 
conducted in a “strictly secular” manner and 
what this meant for the religiously-motivated 
decision of a School Board to prohibit the use of 
books depicting same-sex parented families in 
a Kindergarten family education course. Chief 
Justice McLachlin explained as follows:
The Act’s insistence on strict secularism does 
not mean that religious concerns have no 
place in the deliberations and decisions of the 
Board. Board members are entitled, and in-
deed required, to bring the views of the par-
ents and communities they represent to the 
deliberation process. Because religion plays 
an important role in the life of many com-
munities, these views will often be motivated 
by religious concerns. Religion is an integral 
aspect of people’s lives, and cannot be left at 
the boardroom door. What secularism does 
rule out, however, is any attempt to use the re-
ligious views of one part of the community to 
exclude from consideration the values of other 
members of the community. A requirement of 
secularism implies that, although the Board is 
indeed free to address the religious concerns 
of parents, it must be sure to do so in a man-
ner that gives equal recognition and respect to 
other members of the community. Religious 
views that deny equal recognition and respect 
to the members of a minority group cannot be 
used to exclude the concerns of the minority 
group. This is fair to both groups, as it ensures 
that each group is given as much recognition 
as it can consistently demand while giving the 
same recognition to others.21
One sees the complexity and tensions sur-
rounding the idea of “the secular” described in 
this section reflected, albeit not resolved, in this 
quotation: on the one hand, “strict secularism” 
imposes real limits on the permissible forms of 
public debate and grounds for legal decision-
making; on the other, it does not bar religion 
from law and public decision-making, and im-
poses obligations of inclusion and respect. Giv-
en an array of available and defensible options, 
how one understands the common injunction 
that a modern constitutional democracy must 
be “secular” is crucial in shaping one’s ultimate 
sense of the just relationship between law and 
religion. It is to the related question of the na-
ture of legal tolerance and accommodation that 
I now turn.
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2.	 Multiculturalism,	
accommodation,	and	the	limits	of	
tolerance
“Every age,” Paul Kahn writes in his essential 
study of contemporary liberalism, “has its own 
point of access to ethical and political delibera-
tion. For us, that point is the problem of cul-
tural pluralism.”22 The ur-case of cultural plu-
ralism in modern political history is religious 
difference, but questions of cultural pluralism 
have expanded well beyond their religiously fo-
cused foundations; indeed, one might say that 
the religious roots of multiculturalism have 
been hidden by the many other forms of cul-
tural diversity that have grown in countries like 
Canada, the U.S., the U.K., and France. Nev-
ertheless, the imperative to create some form 
of accommodation or tolerance for beliefs and 
practices other than those of the majority cul-
ture continues to appear in some of its most 
challenging contemporary forms in matters of 
religious difference. Increasing quantities of ink 
are now being spilled on the application of doc-
trines of multiculturalism and accommodation 
to matters of deep religious difference. The con-
cepts of tolerance, accommodation, and mul-
ticulturalism are wedded though distinguish-
able; multiculturalism designates a state policy 
towards cultural difference, whereas toleration 
and accommodation gesture to legal and policy 
responses to instances of difference. The expres-
sion of respect for multiculturalism and juridi-
cal and political recognition of the need for tol-
erance and accommodation is so prevalent as 
to seem anodyne. A recent decision by the Su-
preme Court of Canada on the permissible use 
of religious law in a secular society begins with 
the kind of statement that one could find in the 
judicial or political rhetoric of most modern 
western democracies: “Canada rightly prides 
itself on its evolutionary tolerance for diversi-
ty and pluralism. This journey has included a 
growing appreciation for multiculturalism, in-
cluding the recognition that ethnic, religious or 
cultural differences will be acknowledged and 
respected.”23
The great difficulty concealed by these 
placid statements is that cultural and religious 
difference carries with it strongly-held norma-
tive views that may grate mightily on the values 
and moral positions of society at large, posi-
tions and values that are commonly embedded 
in and expressed through the law. Kahn reflects 
the true ethical and moral challenge of cultural 
pluralism:
Lacking a conviction in the absolute truth of 
our own beliefs and practices, we are uncer-
tain how to respond to those who live by dif-
ferent norms. We are all too aware that such 
differences exist, as we interact with cultures 
that put different values on life and death, fam-
ily and society, religion and the state, men and 
women. We constantly confront the question 
of whether some of the practices supported by 
these values are beyond the limits of our own 
commitment to liberal moral philosophy and a 
political practice of tolerance. We worry about 
moral cowardice when we fail to respond criti-
cally, and about cultural imperialism when we 
do respond.24
Religious diversity poses these dilemmas stark-
ly and confronts the law with the question to 
which I alluded in the discussion of secular-
ism—what are the appropriate limits on reli-
gious difference in a liberal constitutional de-
mocracy committed to certain principles and 
visions of the good, but for which respect and 
tolerance for cultural difference stands as one 
such good?
Legal and philosophical scholarship has 
responded with a variety of attempts to artic-
ulate a basis for a workable approach to man-
aging religious and cultural difference. At the 
more theoretical end of things, Charles Taylor 
has expounded an influential conception of 
multiculturalism that is based on a politics of 
mutual recognition.25 In a similar vein, James 
Tully has wrestled with issues of deep cultural 
difference in the Indigenous context by devel-
oping a conception of treaty constitutionalism 
that, again, grounds legal and political relation-
ships in recognition and reciprocity.26 Taylor 
and Tully approach the matter from the per-
spective of political philosophy, seeking to de-
velop a more robust ethical foundation for a 
meaningful form of multiculturalism. Where 
these theories have been thin on practical de-
tails, others have sought to work with concepts 
of multiculturalism in a manner that generates 
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principles that can guide the legal management 
of the line between tolerance and the protec-
tion of public values, the fraught line to which 
Kahn has pointed. Will Kymlicka’s highly in-
fluential work is of this second type. Kymlicka’s 
Multicultural Citizenship articulates a model of 
legal multiculturalism based on a distinction 
between internal restrictions (rules and norms 
of a community that bind members within the 
group) and external protections (principles im-
posed by society that seek to promote fairness 
between minority groups).27 Kymlicka ulti-
mately argues that “liberals can and should en-
dorse certain external protections . . . but should 
reject internal restrictions which limit the right 
of group members to question and revise tradi-
tional authorities and practices.”28 For Kymlic-
ka, then, multiculturalism involves inter-group 
toleration but requires attention to intra-group 
liberty. More recently, Ayelet Shachar has sug-
gested a form of religious multiculturalism that 
has as its centrepiece the concept of “transfor-
mative accommodation.”29 Shachar defends the 
importance of the accommodation of diverse 
religious cultures while identifying the ways in 
which women are particularly vulnerable in the 
private spheres, in which most models of secu-
larism permit religion a robust autonomy. She 
uses the concept of jurisdiction as a means of 
providing a balance between respect for and 
tolerance of religious cultures and the protec-
tion of the rights of women within these com-
munities. In her approach, neither religious 
groups nor the state would have a monopoly 
on decisional authority as regards the commu-
nity; rather they would share jurisdiction with 
defined “reversal points” at which community 
members could choose to opt for the state’s ju-
risdiction over that of the religious community. 
In the end, Shachar argues that such a model 
will provide a due degree of accommodation of 
difference while encouraging religious commu-
nities to tend to the interests of vulnerable sub-
groups, ultimately leading to the liberalization 
of orthodox communities.
However, features of the models suggested 
by both Kymlicka and Shachar point to an emer-
gent and important strand of scholarship that 
questions the concept of toleration at a foun-
dational level. Wendy Brown suggests that the 
idea of toleration has an ineradicable dimension 
of domination woven into its very fabric.30 Tol-
eration, Brown argues, is a means of inscribing 
and affirming the difference of minority groups 
(the tolerated) while preserving the power and 
privilege of the group that gets to do the tolerat-
ing. Brown’s compelling study suggests that tol-
eration is not, in the end, so tolerant—at least in 
the sense suggested in most political and legal 
rhetoric. Others have begun to take this insight 
and apply it to the practices of legal toleration 
of religious difference.31 Guided by Bernard 
Williams’ philosophical insight that true tol-
eration involves ceding territory on matters of 
deep importance to oneself,32 does the protec-
tion of religious freedom actually yield tolera-
tion of the kind promised in the story of legal 
multiculturalism? Carefully considered, legal 
toleration may amount to simply the recogni-
tion of those points at which the central values 
of a liberal constitutional democracy are not 
troubled or threatened by religious difference. 
When this line of indifference is transgressed, 
the law enforces its commitments and concep-
tions of the good. Are the limits of toleration 
precisely the boundaries of what truly matters 
to the law, with legal toleration of religion ul-
timately serving as a means of enforcing the 
liberal culture embedded in modern constitu-
tionalism? This is arguably the underlying logic 
and effect of the models proposed by both Kym-
licka and Shachar; and if this account of legal 
toleration is accurate, the tools of the law offer 
no easy escape from the multiculturalist conun-
drum that Kahn so poignantly exposes. In the 
end, the question of the politics of multicultur-
alism and toleration remains a substantial issue 
in the interaction of law and religion, one that 
points not only to the value-infused nature of 
legal culture, but also to the complex nature of 
legal rights and the adjudication of religion.
3.	 The	nature	of	rights	and	the	
adjudication	of	religion
While contemporary scholarship has raised 
questions regarding the structure and nature of 
the legal toleration of religion, the adjudication 
of claims of freedom of religion has exposed is-
sues about the nature of rights and adjudication 
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to which scholarship must now react. These is-
sues are tied closely to the matters discussed 
thus far—the nature of the secular and the lim-
its of toleration. Both secularism and toleration 
are, at base, proxy concepts for the line-drawing 
that seems intrinsic to the management of deep 
religious difference in contemporary constitu-
tional democracies. The core task of constitu-
tional adjudication of religious freedom—the 
central means by which the interaction of law 
and religion manifests in the modern legal 
arena—amounts to an exercise in defining the 
boundaries of religious liberty in light of the 
core values embedded in the public legal or-
der. As courts have engaged in this boundary-
drawing exercise, the adjudication of religious 
freedom has yielded lessons about the structure 
of rights and the nature of the adjudication of 
religious freedom. Consider two such lessons.
First, with respect to the structure and 
nature of rights, the adjudication of claims of 
religious freedom has shown that it is much 
more difficult to “take rights seriously” than is 
imagined by those, like Ronald Dworkin,33 who 
have advocated for an understanding of consti-
tutional rights as trumps—as legal principles 
whose vindication over other public policy mat-
ters is assured by their status as “rights.” Adju-
dication of matters of religious freedom has put 
this conception of rights under serious stress. 
The normative and ontological “thickness” in-
volved in religion has made the adjudication of 
claims of religious freedom particularly adept 
at challenging this understanding of rights. Re-
ligious beliefs and practices are invested with 
ideas about and attitudes towards the world, 
ideas and attitudes that are both central to the 
religious culture and can be at odds with other 
constitutionally protected goods and weighty 
matters of public policy. The Supreme Court 
of Canada has put the difficulty as follows: “In 
judging the seriousness of the limit [on freedom 
of religion] in a particular case, the perspec-
tive of the religious or conscientious claimant 
is important. However, this perspective must 
be considered in the context of a multicultural, 
multi-religious society where the duty of state 
authorities to legislate for the general good in-
evitably produces conflicts with individual be-
liefs.”34 In Canada, freedom of religion jurispru-
dence has been one of the leading contemporary 
sources of cases showing the potential for the 
conflict of rights, cases in which a claim of free-
dom of religion comes into conflict with an-
other constitutional guarantee, frequently the 
protection of equality. What should be done 
when the protection of religious freedom con-
flicts with the protection of equality on the basis 
of sexual orientation? Such cases have demon-
strated that the protection of rights is rarely, in 
practice, a matter of “trumps.”35 Conflicts be-
tween rights and serious conflict between reli-
gious freedom and pressing public interests are 
the rule, not the exception. As such, freedom of 
religion cases have been particularly important 
in putting to the philosophic community the 
challenge of thinking about rights as markers 
for a set of interests (among many) rather than 
as non-negotiable imperatives. The dominant 
theoretical and jurisprudential answer to this 
practical reality has been to argue that the key 
task of constitutional adjudication is that of the 
balancing of rights and interests through pro-
portionality tests.36 One scholar has gone so far 
as to characterize proportionality balancing as 
the “ultimate rule of law”37—a far cry from the 
idea of rights as trumps.
Scholars have pointed to a second lesson 
about the nature of adjudication and the struc-
ture of the right of religious freedom that ap-
pears to emerge from the jurisprudence and, in 
particular, the boundary-drawing that seems 
inherent in the concepts of both secularism and 
legal toleration. This incipient line of argument 
suggests that the adjudication of religious free-
dom inevitably involves the imposition of some 
juridical conception of what religion is, or what 
about religion really matters, and, in so doing, 
imposes a legal filter on what “counts” as pro-
tected religion.  Writing from the U.S. setting, 
Winnifred Sullivan has put the argument most 
starkly in her book The Impossibility of Reli-
gious Freedom.38 The essence of Sullivan’s posi-
tion is that the use of any concept of religious 
freedom requires a definition of religion and in 
this very act of defining religion certain ortho-
doxies are imposed while other dimensions of 
lived religion and the variety of modes of be-
ing religious are diminished or excluded from 
legal protection. “Crudely speaking,” Sullivan 
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argues, forms of religion that are private, volun-
tary, and believed rather than practiced (forms 
she refers to as “protestant”) are “free” whereas 
other forms of religion are “closely regulated by 
law.”39 I have argued that adjudication of reli-
gion requires the imposition of a definition of 
religion and that this definition is informed by 
the cultural commitments of the constitutional 
rule of law itself, a culture of law’s rule that is 
deeply indebted to and contiguous with core 
components of the political culture of liberal-
ism, which privileges autonomy and choice over 
identity, the individual over the group, and in-
sists on a more-or-less stable division between 
the public and private dimensions of human 
life.40 “Law shapes religion in its own ideologi-
cal image and likeness and conceptually con-
fines it to the individual, choice-centred, and 
private dimensions of human life.”41 Adjudica-
tion of rights-based claims cannot be insulated 
from the informing culture of law’s rule and, as 
such, involves the imposition of a particular set 
of beliefs about what is of value in the human 
being and the shape of a good society—matters 
on which religious communities hold strong 
commitments of their own.
4.	 Why	protect	religion?
Attention to the difficulties involved in the ad-
judication of religious freedom claims, includ-
ing the manner in which freedom of religion 
seems readily to fall into conflict with other 
rights, gestures to a final—and fundamental—
question raised in the scholarship regarding 
the interaction of religion and modern consti-
tutionalism. The variety of claims made under 
free exercise or religious freedom clauses, the 
challenges that these claims pose for recon-
ciliation with public policy, and the manner in 
which they have drawn civic debate into ques-
tions of the degree of moral difference tolerable 
in a secular society, all suggest a foundational 
question—why do we single out religious belief 
and practice for special constitutional protec-
tion? The obvious follow-up is “and should we 
continue to do so?” To reach back to the discus-
sion of secularism, in his magisterial study of 
the concept and nature of secularism, Charles 
Taylor explores three ways of thinking about 
“the secular.”42 One model of secularism in-
volves the retreat of religion from public spaces 
(secularism 1); another is the general decline of 
religious belief and practice in society (secular-
ism 2). But Taylor’s argument is that the essence 
of modern secularism is best understood as the 
comparatively modern shift “from a society 
in which it was virtually impossible not to be-
lieve in God, to one in which faith, even for the 
staunchest believer, is one human possibility 
among others” (secularism 3).43 There is a great 
deal to commend this understanding of secu-
larism, but it raises the difficult question that is 
the final conceptual fault line in the interaction 
of law and religion that I wish to explore: if reli-
gion has become one possible means of human 
flourishing among many other options, why do 
constitutions continue to single out and protect 
religion?
One forceful answer that has emerged in 
the scholarship is that “[t]here is simply no good 
reason for offering religion a priority over other 
deep passions and commitments.”44 Larry Sager 
and Christopher Eisgruber have been the lead-
ing and most explicit proponents of this view.45 
Reflecting on the U.S. context, Eisgruber and 
Sager have argued that there is no defensible ba-
sis for affording religious beliefs and actions a 
particular constitutional privilege. Their argu-
ment is not that religious beliefs and actions are 
undeserving of constitutional regard. Rather, 
their thesis is a kind of levelling move, suggest-
ing that the reasons for protecting religious free-
dom can be fully accounted for through more 
generally applicable constitutional principles 
of equality and liberty. A combination of basic 
equality considerations and a general liberty 
principle—a combination that Eisgruber and 
Sager call the principle of “Equal Liberty”—is 
sufficient to take full account of what animates 
our instincts to protect religion. The protection 
of religious freedom is nothing more, in short, 
than a particular application of constitutional 
protections available to all, irrespective of the 
specifically religious dimension of their beliefs, 
identity, or actions.46
To the question of why we find specific ref-
erence to religious freedom in constitutions 
around the world if the “problem” of religious 
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freedom is wholly answerable with a generally 
applicable Equal Liberty principle, Sager and 
Eisgruber answer by noting that history has 
shown that religion is “especially vulnerable to 
hostility or neglect.”47 Specific protections of re-
ligious freedom are, on this view, simply mark-
ers for a basis on which the Equal Liberty prin-
ciple has often been breached. There is nothing, 
however, distinctively valuable about the “re-
ligion” in freedom of religion that attracts (or 
ought to attract) constitutional protection.
Other scholars have offered a very differ-
ent answer to the question of why constitutions 
specifically protect religion, explicitly rejecting 
the idea that abstract principles of equality and 
liberty give sufficient account for the special 
regard that constitutions give to religious free-
dom. “[W]e are fooling ourselves,” one author 
writes in direct response to Sager’s argument, 
“if we think we can define a coherent concep-
tion of freedom of religion without recognising 
that the freedom presupposes an affirmative 
valuing of religion. If we attempt to do so, we al-
most always end up smuggling in a covert valu-
ing of religious practice.”48 In the constitutional 
protection of religion one finds an abiding sense 
that religious views have a special place in the 
way in which a person makes sense of his or her 
world and that religion speaks to a dimension 
of human existence deserving of regard and re-
spect. Although equality and liberty are neces-
sary aspects of the constitutional protection of 
religious belief and practice, freedom of religion 
cannot be accounted for separate from a soci-
etal recognition of the unique depth and impor-
tance that religion continues to hold for fellow 
members of our political community. Certain 
writers take a more utilitarian approach, em-
phasizing the goods that religion (perhaps 
uniquely) brings to society, benefits that better 
explain why religion is and ought to be given 
distinct constitutional regard. Although recog-
nizing its potentially pernicious faces, Parekh 
notes that religion has historically served as an 
important counterweight to state authority, ani-
mating a number of emancipatory movements, 
“nurturing sensibilities and values the latter ig-
nores or suppresses,”49 and providing a host of 
other benefits to society.
Yet separate from (if related to) these moral 
and utilitarian answers to the question, “why 
protect religion?”, there is also a tantalizing on-
tological possibility: does freedom of religion 
serve as a marker for a kind of anxiety about 
metaphysical certainty within the law? Perhaps 
the special protection given to freedom of reli-
gion flows in part from a recognition that re-
ligion asks the kinds of questions and affords 
forms of answer to which the law is neither in-
clined nor equipped to respond. And if these 
questions and answers are both important and 
unanswerable within the law, freedom of reli-
gion may be a cautionary principle—an ex-
pression of law’s modesty about what it can say 
about the structure of things and meaning of an 
individual or community’s experiences.
5.	 Concluding	comments
The select key theoretical issues canvassed in 
this piece demonstrate the manner in which 
the interaction of law and religion has emerged 
as a uniquely valuable contemporary site for 
reflection on questions central to the philoso-
phy of law. Be it the nature of adjudication, the 
structure of rights, the role of law in contem-
porary public life, or issues of law’s relation-
ship to moral and cultural diversity, cases and 
controversies about religion and religious free-
dom arising in modern western constitutional 
orders have afforded invaluable avenues into 
central questions of social and legal philosophy. 
The interaction of law and religion has provided 
unique traction to scholars working on basic is-
sues in religious studies, political theory, legal 
philosophy, and jurisprudence. In concluding 
this piece, I wish to gesture to an issue that sits 
at the foundation of all of these questions.
Any or all of these various lines of inquiry 
opened up by attention to the modern politi-
cal and juridical interaction between law and 
religion ultimately require reflection on a fun-
damental question in legal theory, the nature 
of “the rule of law.” It is a precious conceit of 
modern constitutionalism that law enjoys au-
tonomy from culture. Its role is to sit above the 
realm of the cultural, curating but not itself 
participating in the world of vying ontologies, 
epistemologies, and metaphysics that is incum-
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bent in a society marked by deep cultural and 
religious difference. This conceit is an aspect 
of law’s fierce commitment to its own neutral-
ity as the ground for its authority. Yet each of 
the veins of inquiry identified in this piece—the 
meaning of the secular; the limits of legal toler-
ance; the structure of rights and nature of adju-
dication; and the basis for the protection of re-
ligion—destabilizes the separation between the 
role and function of culture and the rule of law. 
As one digs deeply into each or any of these is-
sues, the nature of the constitutional rule of law 
as one means of ordering experience, of making 
sense of the world, of providing a horizon with-
in which to interpret human affairs, becomes 
more and more difficult to ignore. In this, one 
sees that the great richness of the study of the 
interaction of law and religion lies not solely in 
the study of identity and diversity or in what it 
suggests about religion in the modern consti-
tutional democracy; enormous challenge and 
edification inhere in what the study of law’s re-
lationship with religion suggests and invites by 
way of reflection about the nature of law itself.
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